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Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case
Management Issues in Bankruptcy*
Mr. Richard Cieri, Honorable Judith Fitzgerald &
Ms. Judith Greenstone Miller
MR. CIERI: We're actually going to try to cover three topics today,
forum shopping, first day orders, and case management issues arising
in Chapter 11 cases. The first topic that we will cover is venue (or
forum shopping). This is a particularly interesting issue to discuss to-
day because of a new decision that has come down out of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. This court's
decisions will certainly affect the desirability of debtors to commence
Chapter 11 cases in this district. But before we talk about that deci-
sion, we will provide a little bit of background with respect to the issue
of venue (or forum shopping).
The statutory framework for choosing where a debtor may com-
mence a case is set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1408. The statute pro-
vides that a debtor can file or commence a case in five different
places: a debtor's domicile, its residence, its principal place of busi-
ness, where its principal assets in the United States are located for the
greater of 180 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, or in
the same district as a pending bankruptcy case concerning the debtor's
affiliate, general partner, or partnership.
Basically you can file a case where you perform a substantial
amount of business, you can file a case where you are headquartered,
and you can file a case where there is a pending case involving an
affiliate company.
On a practical basis, the affiliated company venue basis often times
leads debtors to commence a case for a subsidiary that does not have
any assets or has limited operations. It's a protective filing. The filing
protects a venue in which the debtor may later wish to commence a
case.
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the first panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPosiuM, Mega-Bankruptcies: Representing Creditors and
Debtors in Large Bankruptcies, held on April 10, 2003.
516 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
For example, if you take KMart,1 KMart could have commenced a
case for one of its real estate subsidiaries under this venue basis in
Chicago. This action would have protected KMart against an involun-
tary filing that may have been commenced against it in Southfield,
Michigan, where they're headquartered. And then, if that involuntary
was ever filed against K-Mart in Southfield, they could have just trans-
ferred the case to Chicago as a matter of right because there was a
case pending with an affiliate.
While that is the statutory framework for venue, the following fac-
tors are what is really important for an understanding of how people
go about choosing a venue: first, the differences in the law among the
judicial districts on key issues, and Judy Miller is going to touch on
that in a few minutes; second, the relative experience and predictabil-
ity of the bankruptcy courts in the potential districts; third, the conve-
nience of the judicial district to the parties; and finally, the probability
that the venue will likely be challenged.
For a long time, bankruptcy practitioners would go to Delaware and
commence every case in Delaware. It was very convenient. All the
New York lawyers could hop on the train and go to Delaware in the
morning and come back in the evening and see their families. It was
really a pretty nice thing. Everybody knew what were the good hotels
in Delaware, and the one or two good restaurants.
HON. FITZGERALD: I have a room dedicated to me in Delaware.
MR. CIERI: But then we found out that questions of law actually
became important in bankruptcy cases, you simply can't file cases
based upon a place where it's comfortable to sleep, or a place where
you might get a good meal, and Delaware became a less favorable
venue to commence a case. And again, Judy Miller will touch on
some of this.
But, in the view of some practioners, the Third Circuit has become a
bad place to file a case because of some bad law regarding intellectual
property, which actually suggests the possibility that the debtor cannot
assume a contract that it might not be able to assume outside of Chap-
ter 11. Also, it has become the view of some practioners that Dela-
ware is a bad place to commence a case because of some decisions
with respect to how you determine solvency at the time dividend pay-
ments may have been made, determining solvency at a time a com-
pany may have entered into certain transactions, and how a court may
1. Kmart filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 22, 2002 in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
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actually arrive at a solvency determination when you measure a com-
pany's contingent tort liabilities.
And, lastly, it may have became a bad place to commence a case
because it became really hard for debtors to assign claims to third
parties to pursue; a practice that we have all engaged in for many
years. And it's the only practical way of trying to deal with claims that
a creditors' committee might actually want to bring, that the debtor
probably wouldn't want to bring. For example, pursuing claims
against former directors and officers.
In choosing a venue, the second thing we focus on as practitioners is
the relative experience and predictability of the bankruptcy courts in
the potential districts. And again, Delaware was a wonderful place to
file because when you went to court on the first day of a case, you
knew how far you could push your requests for "first day" relief. Eve-
rybody knew what the rules were with respect to "first day" relief.
In addition, when you went to Delaware you knew exactly what the
rules were for your DIP financing or debtor-in-possession financing.
There were not a lot of negotiations regarding the terms of a 30-page
order. You knew what the court would accept and what the court
would not accept. In fact, we are going to touch on that whole issue of
predictability in the context of a recent decision that just came down
in the KMart case.2
The third factor that is important for practitioners in choosing a
venue, is the convenience of the judicial district to the parties. There
are some people who would suggest that Mr. Kieselstein's partner,
Jamie Sprayregen, commenced the United Airlines case in Chicago be-
cause, why, he wanted to be able to go home at night and sleep. And
if you know Jamie, it's very infrequent for him to get home.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: It's very infrequent for him to sleep.
MR. CIERI: And this whole convenience of the judicial district to the
parties is really touched on in the Enron3 decision that is discussed in
the materials. In Enron, the court basically said New York is some-
thing special because all the bankruptcy practitioners, all the banks,
and the restructuring professionals are mostly centered in New York.
Well, I would like to disagree with that but-
HON. FITZGERALD: Me too.
MS. MILLER: Me three.
2. Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp. (In re Kmart Corp.), 291 B.R. 818 (N.D. I1. 2003).
3. In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327, 349 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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MR. CIERI: The Enron court said that because New York City is so
convenient for everyone to deal with these kinds of large scale, mega
cases, New York as the venue is presumptively allowed.
MS. MILLER: However, don't you think they preferred certain cred-
itors' convenience over other creditors in Enron? I mean, if you really
looked at where the majority of the people that were creditors were
situated, was New York really convenient for them?
HON. FITZGERALD: But that's true for Delaware jurisdictions,
too. I sit in Delaware by designation. Delaware tends to attract cases
that are incorporated in Delaware, but have no connection with the
state. In some instances, there isn't even a single creditor on the ma-
trix in the bankruptcy case that is from Delaware.
So it is convenient as a location to New York and Philadelphia and
Washington, and I guess if you think that the Philadelphia airport is
something to go into and out of, it is convenient to that, too. But the
reality is that it's convenient for a purpose, but it is not convenient for
the parties.
So I'd like to expand Judy's question out of New York to say, isn't
that true regardless of the venue in which the case is chosen when it
isn't the center of the corporate activities.
MR. CIERI: And that actually goes to the fourth factor practioners
utilize in determining which venue to commence a case: the
probability that the venue will likely be challenged.
Now, the dirty secret among restructuring professionals is that if
you have a case that commences in Delaware or in New York, it is
very unlikely that venue will actually be challenged. Now, it was a
little different in Delaware when the state was overwhelmed with
cases. But there was a period of time perhaps, Martin, what would
you say, two years ago, when everything in Delaware came to a stop,
and the Delaware courts actually started to boot cases out of there.
In fact, Delaware became a less attractive venue choice - the re-
structuring professionals went over the top, and cases that involved
under $100 million of assets were being commenced in Delaware. I
mean, Delaware had a special status among professionals for big,
mega cases, and then you saw 30-, 40-, 50-million-dollar cases com-
menced there; Delaware started to slide in its attractiveness as a filing
venue.
HON. FITZGERALD: But is some of that the fact that the district
court withdrew the reference involving Chapter 11s and then sent
them all back, and then withdrew the reference of all Chapter 11s and
then sent them all back? As a result, you lost the continuity judges,
[Vol. 1:515
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you lost the learning curve perspective, issues didn't get addressed,
trials were conducted and opinions weren't issued because the judges
kept changing. Did that affect anything?
MS. MILLER: But you also have the practical concerns of changing
venue. By the time you get the motion to change the venue filed and
actually get before the court, look at what has been decided in the first
couple of days of the case. So you have your learning curve with your
first judge, and then if you're successful in actually showing that venue
wasn't appropriate, then you have to start over and get reeducated
again.
HON. FITZGERALD: Sometimes with different counsel.
MR. CIERI: In fact, Judge Fitzgerald, do you want to just touch on
your views of the various venues?
HON. FITZGERALD: Do you think there is a factor that is involved
with the assignment of cases, I guess is my first comment.
MR. CIERI: I will try to answer that question. I will tell you that
when a practitioner tries to determine where to file a case, he looks at
every judge. Most of these cases can be filed in multiple jurisdictions,
and when we are preparing a case for a Chapter 11 filing, we will
actually prepare a chart that will look at each of the districts, it will
look at whether or not professionals are being paid, whether or not
they are being paid at their normal rates, and how long will it take
professionals to get paid. The chart will also reflect how various legal
issues may be determined by the court.
Now, each debtor confronts different legal issues. Some debtors
have legal issues that are particularly important to it in the environ-
mental area. It might be a debtor who's concerned about its ability to
assume certain intellectual property licenses. Other debtors might be
mostly concerned about their ability to reject collective bargaining
agreements.
For example, I am certain when United Airlines filed for Chapter
11, it looked at all the places that it might commence a case and deter-
mined what jurisdiction might have the most favorable law with re-
spect to the ability to reject collective bargaining agreements.
So when we look at venues, we look at a lot of different factors, but
the one thing I think that law students need to understand, which I'm
certain all the practitioners in the room understand, is that the ability
to get paid is quite important.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, I have heard, I guess since I'm not in-
volved in the practice of law but see only the tip of the iceberg from
20031
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the cases, that the consistency in rulings and the ability to make sure
that you can get paid on an interim basis is important. The Bank-
ruptcy Code permits interim applications for payment every 120 days.
But in mega cases, most of the courts have at least administrative or-
ders, if not local rules, in place that permit more frequent applications,
they generally have some sort of a process by which the professional
can be paid on a monthly basis a certain percentage of the fee that is
uncontested, maybe 75 or 80 percent of the overall fee.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: (Indicating.)
HON. FITZGERALD: Higher now? He's telling me higher. 90 per-
cent, 100 percent?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: In United - 100 would be good, but United is
90, which, again, depending on the scale of the case-
HON. FITZGERALD: Is a significant issue.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I would say 10 percent is a significant holdback
on a case.
HON. FITZGERALD: And then most of the time there is a prove-
up on a quarterly reconciliation basis, so that regardless of what the
percentage is that you're paid, on a monthly basis at the quarterly fee
application hearing, whatever amount your fees and expenses are al-
lowed, the debtor then has to pay the balance of what's owed on that
quarterly basis.
In most jurisdictions, that's happening. The difficulty is that, even
when it is by local rule, the judges can always vary that practice in any
specific case. And so if you have got a court with, for example, nine
judges on it, and eight of them are willing to honor that type of pro-
cess and one is not, then the kind of analysis that Mr. Cieri is talking
about affects whether or not cases will be filed in that district because
of the one judge who will not do what the other eight in the district
will do. So I have heard that is an issue, and I think that probably is a
major issue that drives cases into particular districts.
I think the ability to get your first day motions heard is also very
important to both debtors and the lenders. For example, employees
who may have some gap period where they haven't been paid their
wages, which were owed prepetition, and now the filing hits in the
middle of that pay period, obviously they need to be paid. It is crucial
to them that they can get their paychecks issued. But because of that
time line factor, without being able to get a prompt hearing before the
judge, so that those payments can be made, they will be treated like
[Vol. 1:515
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any other unsecured claim. They have a priority for a certain amount
of their wages.
MR. CIERI: Can I interject just for a second? Another good exam-
ple of the importance of getting timely first day relief occurs with re-
tail Chapter 11 debtors. For example, you place a deposit down on a
coat, you know, a layaway purchase and then the company files for
bankruptcy; the claim that you have to buy that coat is a prepetition
claim.
So think about the impact upon a retailer, for example, that can't
honor layaway purchases or warranty claims. You buy a product
prepetition. You have a warranty on the claim. The product breaks.
You go into the store to return it after the company files for bank-
ruptcy. Technically it's a prepetition claim.
HON. FITZGERALD: And, of course, that is the purpose of Chap-
ter 11, allowing a debtor to reorganize its affairs. So if you don't have
a process in place that permits the reorganization, then I would sup-
pose that is not going to be a favorably looked upon venue to file the
case.
I think to the extent that certain districts have either rules or very
well-advertised procedures in place that deal with first day motions,
this is something that drives cases to those districts, too, because debt-
ors, or whoever are filing the first day motions, they're almost always
debtors, need to know who to serve. They need to know what mo-
tions will be heard. They need to know how long, or short, an interim
period of relief they'll be granted before there is a final hearing set up.
They need to know how extensive the relief will be. So I think all of
those factors affect it as well.
MS. MILLER: If I might interject? There are a number of courts
across the country that have appointed rules committees because of
the nonexistence of specific local rules to set forth what the processes
and procedures were. It used to be dealing in secret or hoping that
you associated with someone on a local basis that could grease the
skids, so to speak, so that you knew how to go about it.
And I think that there are a number of courts across the country, as
I will address, that are not getting the mega cases because there are no
specific procedures that are articulated enabling you to know what
you have to do to get what you want.
HON. FITZGERALD: I think the issue about the experience of the
judges, quite frankly, is a make-weight argument. You only get expe-
rience if you have the opportunity to sit on cases, and you don't have
2003]
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the opportunity to sit on cases if they aren't filed in the district in
which you sit.
And, therefore, when I hear an attorney say that the experience of
the judge is something that drives the cases to that venue, it sort of
raises the hair on the back of my neck because I don't know how you
can get that experience.
There are some districts, I think, that are actually out soliciting busi-
ness, and this is jumping ahead a little, but I really wonder how appro-
priate it is for a court to be out there soliciting cases that are not cases
truly belonging in their district.
You know, do you like the concept of the judge as a rainmaker,
because that's what this is. When a court actively goes out and solicits
cases, the judge is being a rainmaker. Is that appropriate? Is that
what you expect from your independent and fair judiciary?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, can I interject? In our local groups, we
have the judges who will occasionally say, "It has been a long time
since you filed in Chicago." You would occasionally hear a little com-
ment about it. It was more like keep the home fires burning. If you
have got a hometown case, why don't you think more about whether
or not you can keep it at home and not so much about where else you
can bring it.
MR. CIERI: For example, when Montgomery Ward filed,4 Jones Day
was counsel to Ward. My partner at the time, David Kurtz, led that
Chapter 11 case, and the client chose to file the case in Delaware.
Well, the particular chief judge at the time in Chicago led an effort
attempting to change the venue rules to prohibit filing in the state in
which you were incorporated.
HON. FITZGERALD: Frankly, I think the state of incorporation is
the least of all relevant places to file a bankruptcy. I understand why
it's in the statute as a venue choice, but I think it's the least of all
relevant places.
And I'm not in a position to advocate legislation. I don't think
there's going to be a change in legislation as long as Senator Biden has
anything to say about it, so I want that very clear. I'm not trying to
advocate some change. But I do think that a more appropriate focus
for where cases ought to be filed would be the chief place of business
or the corporate headquarters.
Now, the corporate headquarters is not necessarily much better
from the place of incorporation, just because your corporate head-
4. Montgomery Ward filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 7, 1997 in Delaware.
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quarters are, for example, in Pittsburgh that doesn't mean that is
where your center of operations really are. I'll use Heinz as a big
example. Their worldwide headquarters are in Pittsburgh, but their
operations at this point in time are pretty much every place but Pitts-
burgh. So if they filed bankruptcy and filed it in Pittsburgh, I do not
know if that would really be much different from filing in the place of
incorporation, which is also not likely to have many creditors there.
But I think in many instances, at least in the below-the-hundred-
million-dollar-level cases, it would be a more appropriate place be-
cause you would be finding at least some of yotir creditors with access
to the courts in that jurisdiction.
MS. MILLER: There also may be a greater sensitivity to the impact
on the community where the case is located.
HON. FITZGERALD: Oh, for sure.
MS. MILLER: For instance, if a major hospital files for bankruptcy
and ultimately the result is going to throw out not having a successful
reorganization, resulting in the loss of employment to all of its em-
ployees, that has to have a different impact when the case is being
heard in the community where the interests are actually impacted.
MR. CIERI: Actually, that was the point I was going to make. Let
me give you some examples because lawyers are always weighing the
value of the home court advantage.
There are times you want to be in your home court, and there are
times you do not want to be in your home court. For example, I imag-
ine for United Airlines it was a very difficult choice to decide to file in
Chicago. Why do you think it was difficult? Well, you might say why
would they not want to file in Chicago? United is such a big part of
the Chicago economy. No one wants to see United Airlines not sur-
vive in Chicago. Well, the reason they may not have wanted to file in
Chicago is because it's a very easy place for all the employees to come
to court, make things difficult, and have more of a presence in the
bankruptcy proceedings.
We once represented a gentleman, a corporate raider who owned a
large company, and the company was very important to the commu-
nity but we decided not to file the case in that community because the
corporate raider was so hated. Likewise, we filed a steel company
case in an unexpected venue.
HON. FITZGERALD: Yes.
2003]
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MR. CIERI: And the reason is because we understood that the court
would understand how important that entity was to jobs in the
community.
Likewise, in American Airlines, I'm sure if that case ever has to file,
the lawyers will struggle in making their venue decision between
wanting to file in Dallas, where American Airlines is very important
to the local economy, against filing somewhere else which may dimin-
ish the impact of the employee voice.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Since you mentioned United, Rick, in fact,
you're quite right that the labor component is an important part of the
decision. We went back to the Pullman strike. We talked to people
who were not even lawyers about the extent to which Chicago is per-
ceived as a labor town. These are all important factors in making your
choice in a case.
MR. CIERI: Well, maybe this is a good jumping off point because
Marc Kieselstein from Kirkland & Ellis along with his partner Jamie
Sprayregen have recently filed many cases in Chicago. Now, in my
own view, as a result of yesterday's Kmart decision, I think it is very
unlikely anybody will file any large case in Chicago for some time.
The reasoning behind my view is the lack of predictability for the
types of first day relief you are able to actually receive from the court.
And why is that predictability important? Well, because every
debtor, when it files a case, struggles to make the actual soft landing
into Chapter 11. Chapter 11 is a very disruptive process, and if you
can make the soft landing into Chapter 11 so that you do not affect
your customers, you do not affect your vendors, and to some extent,
do not affect your employees, you minimize the detrimental effects of
the Chapter 11 process and maximize the value.
Thus, companies that make a soft landing into Chapter 11 come out
much better than companies that make that hard landing into Chapter
11. And you might compare United Airlines as a company that may
have made a soft landing in Chapter 11. Everybody expected the case
to file. The lawyers had a lot of time to prepare for the filing. I'm
certain that they thought about every particular issue they had to deal
with on the first day for a long period of time beforehand versus a
company that makes a hard landing into Chapter 11.
An example of a company making a hard landing into Chapter 11 is
the Fleming Companies that just filed in Delaware. Fleming is a 5- to
6-billion-dollar operation that distributes groceries. I mean, this is a
big company. Fleming filed in Delaware last week.
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Big company, right? You'd expect the lawyers had a lot of time to
prepare the case. You'd expect the lawyers had a lot of time to think
through all the issues. Fleming filed with no first day relief and no
debtor-in-possession financing.
So the whole question again of hard landing versus soft landing
comes, to a great extent, from your ability to prepare that case and
also the ability to get necessary first day relief. This leads to the ques-
tion of what is necessary first day relief and what are the kinds of
things people get?
HON. FITZGERALD: May I ask one question before we get there
because we sort of skipped over this, and I think it's an issue that
ought to be addressed. How much do the lenders have to do with
driving the case into a particular district? We've been talking about
the debtors, the debtors, the debtors. My perception is, it isn't the
debtors. The debtors know they need to file. The debtors need fi-
nancing. The debtors are going to the banks, and I think the banks
have a great deal to do-I've used the word "banks" in a broad sense.
The lenders have a lot to do with it. Rick?
MR. CIERI: I'm going to defer to Martin on that question because I
see he's raised his head and I'm interested to see what he has to say.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: It became irresistible to break the flow, which
was terrific. Rolling over prepetition debt is a key issue. For those
people unfamiliar with it, rolling over prepetition debt means that if a
bank group is owed $100 million prepetition secured, and the com-
pany needs $20 million new money for its Chapter 11 case, the lender
group one way or the other would prefer, instead of lending $20 mil-
lion new money, to lend $120 million with the first $100 million going
to repay the old debt. That has the effect of making the old debt new
debt, of keeping interest current, of making it administrative, and of
avoiding a cramdown.
MR. BAIRD: And repealing what it was supposed to be.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: We can argue about that later, and maybe I'll
take first licks now. But I want to get back to your question of how
much do they have to do with venue.
If a loan goes nonperforming for 60 or 90 days, most lending institu-
tions are subject to a mandatory write-down of the loan by 50 percent.
If they haven't already reserved for it, which normally they haven't if
the loan is fully secured, that's a hit to earnings. That is dramatic. I
mean, any lending-any banking institution will find it dramatic to
write down a fully secured loan 50 percent. And the fact that they
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may recoup the money later because it was fully secured, "later" could
be two years when the case is over. So it is of incredible importance.
And for that reason, the lending agents-there are only a handful
of banks that normally serve as agents in the big credits, are absolutely
adamant about where they want a case filed. This is because the
venue could mean the difference between a court allowing the rol-
lover and not allowing a rollover, and that hits their earnings big time,
and they make no bones about it.
Moreover, it's not just greed or asking for special treatment that's
driving their intensity. Their credit committees have to approve the
new loan of $20 million. Their credit committees may as well say part
of the reason why we're lending the new money is to protect the old.
If we can't roll over the old and keep it performing, we don't want to
loan 20. Maybe we'll loan 5.
So now it comes back to the debtor. You can file wherever you
want, but if you file in a place that doesn't give you a rollover, you're
going to get 5 million not 20 million, and that's the dynamic that's set
up.
Now, as to, "Is this bad"? If a loan is oversecured, by keeping it
current you can avoid default interest rates. That lending group is
probably your most likely exit facility. I find the old notion that
they're the adversary and we should start fighting on day one, very
unenlightened. If that's my exit facility, I'd rather have a good rela-
tionship with them throughout the case. Keep them performing, let
them avoid their write-down, and avoid the default interest. I'm going
to need them for the exit facility anyway. And cramdown of the bank-
ing groups' secured loan is normally not realistic because you're going
to need an exit facility that has a first lien.
So there's a lot to be said for cultivating the relationship with that
group as opposed to going to war. If you have a real defect in their
loan or security agreement or lender liability, then you're adversaries.
But absent that, it pays to go along with your key lenders' decision.
MR. CIERI: Judge Fitzgerald, I absolutely agree with what Martin
said, but I would disagree with you to the extent that you don't have
that particular issue in every case. If you are not borrowing money
post petition from your preexisting secured bank group, I think the
influence of the banks is a lot less than it used to be, and I think banks
are more receptive now to filings outside of New York.
Now, for example, if you go back to 1985 when LTV Steel filed its
first Chapter 11, they filed a case called In re Chateaugay.5 Chateau-
5. In re Chateaugay, 64 B.R. 990 (S.D. N.Y. 1986).
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gay was the name of the chairman's daughter's horse, and the venue
was based simply upon a bank account in New York City. Well, why
did they file in New York City in that particular case? I understand it
was something that the banks really insisted on.
HON. FITZGERALD: What I'm seeing is a change in the lending
positions. We were talking about the fact that there's an agent. Most
of the lending facilities when you're talking in the hundred million
dollar ranges, and up, are consortiums that are put together. It's not
one bank, and they sell positions. They're actively traded, and that's
what I think the issue is. It's not so much where they file at the begin-
ning. It's how easy it is to trade those claims and how those positions
will change later.
So in respect to the debtor and the banks, I agree, it's nice to have a
good relationship ripe and to be copasetic at the beginning, but what
I'm seeing is it doesn't always end up that way. Sometimes very
shortly after the filing, it changes significantly.
But, anyway, I didn't really want to get sidetracked too much. I just
wanted to get that issue on the table. So, Judy, I'm sorry.
MS. MILLER: No, go ahead. Let me just talk a little more about
venue selection. There are four primary courts in which we're seeing
the majority of the cases filed. I know Rick has already alluded to the
Third Circuit in Delaware based upon speed and previously with the
way in which they dealt with prepackaged plans, the Second Circuit
based upon their experience and exclusivity and dealing with large
financial cases, the Seventh Circuit recently with Chicago based upon
experience and speed, and the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles based
upon the first day relief that they generally will grant.
There was recently an analysis done by two attorneys, one being
Marcia Goldstein out of New York, from Weil Gotshal, and David
Sykes out of Philadelphia, and they went through and they analyzed
each of the major substantive issues to be considered as part of filing
the case and where to file based upon what the circuit had decided.
Based upon the recent KMart decision that came down yesterday in
the Northern District of Illinois on critical vendor payments it ap-
pears, unless that case is appealed and reversed in the Seventh Circuit,
that the Seventh Circuit is no longer going to be a district where you
want to file a case. Where you have paying critical vendors or a sole-
source supplier is where you're going to file. This is because yesterday
the court ultimately said that it is per se a violation to pay a prepeti-
tion claim post-petition outside a plan.
MR. FISCHER: Considering the confirmation hearing is the 14th.
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MR. CIERI: Judy, do you want to provide some background on the
Doctrine of Necessity and how lawyers justify paying prepetition
claims. Perhaps after you hear this discussion, you will conclude that
the problem is that some debtors just went too far in paying prepeti-
tion claims.
MS. MILLER: There is the common law Doctrine of Necessity that
really arose out of the number of railroad cases at the turn of the
century where the only way to maximize the chances of being able to
reorganize was to pay certain creditors that were critical. In essence,
if those creditors didn't get paid, they couldn't maximize the recovery.
If those certain critical creditors didn't get paid and didn't supply
goods and services, they couldn't reorganize; therefore, they would
liquidate and there would be very little if any value for unsecured
creditors. So the Court posited since it's necessary and essential for
the reorganization, it will allow those creditors to be paid.
Section 105(a) of the Code provides that the court may issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title. The cases have gone all over the board
in terms of whether or not that provision authorizes the bankruptcy
court to authorize payments to critical vendors based upon the fact
that there is no absolute prohibition in the Code, and that it is clearly
necessary to effectuate the policy of reorganization that's set forth in
Bildisco and the energy case. As against the other side of the argu-
ment saying that unless you can point to a specific provision in the
Code that authorizes it, you can't allow that payment to be made. By
making that payment to a prepetition creditor, you are in essence pre-
ferring certain creditors over other creditors. You are allowing pay-
ment of a prepetition claim, which is expressly prohibited outside of a
plan, and where there is no guarantee at the front end that ultimately
the rest of the creditor body will receive the same percentage at the
end of the day.
One of the significant cases that has come down over the last two
years is out of Fort Worth. The case is In re Coserv.6 It was issued in
January of 2002. What is interesting about this case is rather than just
dealing with the policy arguments back and forth as to whether or not
the proposed payment should be allowed to prepetition creditors, the
court actually set forth a three-prong test that I think established a
much more significant burden for the debtor on the first day to come
in and to justify that in essence, a particular creditor was critical and
necessary and should be paid.
6. 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
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Oftentimes debtors will file these motions. They'll ask for an aggre-
gate amount to be authorized because that's the amount that has been
negotiated with the lender that the lender will allow to be paid to this
critical vendor body. But there is no absolute specification as to who's
going to get paid what. In fact, the debtor doesn't want to set forth
that specification because then it becomes a question of all of the
creditors who are not on the list coming to them and saying, "Why
aren't I there."
The test that Judge Lynn set forth, which must be demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence, is that, number one, it must be "crit-
ical" that the debtor deal with the claimant. In other words, the
debtor must show that the claimant is virtually indispensable to profit-
able operations or preservation of the estate or is the sole supplier for
a given product.
Number two, unless the debtor deals with the claimant, the debtor
risks the probability of harm or, alternatively, loss of economic advan-
tage to the estate or the debtor's going concern value, which is dispro-
portionate to the amount of the claimant's prepetition claim. In other
words, the debtor must show meaningful economic harm that will be
avoided and materially less than the potential loss to the estate.
And, third, that there is no practical or legal alternative by which
the debtor can deal with the claimant other than by payment of the
claim.
MR. CIERI: So the theory, in effect, being that if you paid a dollar
prepetition claim, the debtor's estate grows by more than that dollar, a
dollar fifty, for example.
HON. FITZGERALD: Isn't it also the fact in most critical vendor
claims that you're not paying 100 cents on the dollar? Almost all of
them are negotiated, plus some of the waiver of the unpaid portion of
the claim.
MR. CIERI: I actually think only some critical vendor orders are like
that.
HON. FITZGERALD: Only some?
MR. CIERI: Yes.
MS. MILLER: Well, and, also, it presupposes as part of most critical
vendor motions, and I'm not sure I've seen one that's gone the other
way, that if you're going to get paid your prepetition claim, you're
going to agree to continue to ship to the debtor on the same credit
terms that you did prepetition.
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So if your terms were 60 days prepetition, the only way you're going
to get paid that prepetition claim is with your agreement to continue
to ship on that basis.
MR. FISCHER: Or better.
MS. MILLER: Or better. And ultimately the creditor has to con-
sider, number one, the risk. Is the estate going to succeed? Is there
going to be any possibility that they're administratively insolvent at
the end of the day where they risk that 60-day portion of not getting
paid, and now the further risk, which we've been dialoguing about is
there are a number of cases that are coming out now where the debtor
on day one comes in and says I'm going to have a hundred percent
plan. So, therefore, if we pay all these critical vendors, it's really not
going to impact what the creditors are going to get at the end of the
day.
Well, all their best predictions on day one were great except for
then the case tubes-it ends up in a Chapter 7, as in the case of Mar-
vel.7 And there the trustee comes back and says, wait a minute, all
these critical vendors got paid this money. The rest of the unsecured
creditors didn't get paid and there has been a material change from
the time such payment was authorized and now. We're going to move
to vacate the order that was entered to authorize the post-petition
payment of these critical vendors under Rule 60(b). And then those
creditors that had relied upon the order and got paid, even though it
would have been an authorized post-petition payment under Section
549, are now having to argue with the trustee in adversary proceedings
of whether or not the amounts they received are subject to
disgorgement.
HON. FITZGERALD: But the problem I think in Marvel, may be
the way first day order was written. Because in some of those first day
orders it doesn't say, "the debtor shall pay." It says, "the debtor may
but need not pay." And I think that's the significant issue, and almost
all of the Delaware orders are written that way.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: The debtor is always seeking authority but not
direction, so then they can go out and-
HON. FITZGERALD: Exactly. That's right.
MR. FISCHER: There is a case that we have in Delaware where the
critical vendor order went nuts, and they were supposed to pay 10
7. Marvel filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December 27, 1996.
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million. Instead they paid 40 million, and it's just a zoo. It's just a zoo
and a disaster.
MR. CIERI: Well, we should talk about what really happens, and I
think they're touching on it. If you are a debtor's lawyer, you're deal-
ing with a company that is very inexperienced in bankruptcy, scared of
what's going to happen, and so your view is that everybody is a critical
vendor.
HON. FITZGERALD: Including the lawyers in one of the Delaware
cases.
MR. CIERI: I mean, so they believe that when you go to them, you
say, look, here's what first day relief is. Here is why first day relief is
important to making a soft landing into Chapter 11. Here are the cat-
egories of claims that you might consider as being critical vendors
based upon our experience.
And then what happens is the debtor sees those categories and eve-
rybody becomes a critical vendor. Lawyers forget that it is the law-
yer's job at that point in time (and some of us have done it better than
others) to push back on the debtor. Because it's very hard for a court
who is hearing first day relief, who wants to be receptive and doesn't
want to take an action that may destroy the business, to actually en-
gage in the kind of critical analysis necessary to determine whether or
not somebody actually is a critical vendor.
So what occurs is that you have certain lawyers, or law firms, who
are a lot better about pushing back than others.
HON. FITZGERALD: My view is I require a list of the critical ven-
dors to be either submitted to the United States Trustee's Office or
filed with the court under seal because I want to make sure that, in
fact, the debtor is doing what the debtor says, and I expect the lawyers
to tell me if the debtor's in breach.
And I certainly don't think in the Third Circuit that you can pay
lawyers as critical vendors because you've got a whole line of profes-
sional appointment cases in that circuit that's very detailed. And I
think that's inappropriate, and in a specific case, I required debtor's
counsel to get the payments made to the lawyers back, and they had
to sue in one instance to do it. Then it got settled, but, nonetheless,
they actually had to bring a lawsuit because of that fact. And the or-
der and the motion were quite clear that they didn't cover lawyers.
So I agree that there are critical vendors and I don't think the
debtor intends to be abusive. I don't think in making the payments
that the debtor's management is thinking that they are violating, they
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are not willfully trying to violate a court order. But the fact is, that is
what they are doing, and it is a violation of the Bankruptcy Code.
MS. MILLER: An example of a case where this abuse took place was
Murphy Marine Services. There the debtor said they were going to
only pay 3.7 million and ultimately paid 38 million.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, that's a little unusual.
MS. MILLER: And it is, but some of those terrible abuses have in
fact, occurred. If you look at the orders that were entered in terms of
critical vendor payments two and three and four years ago as against
the orders that are being entered now, most recently in a case called
Superior TeleCom, it's very specific as to when you can pay, who you
can pay, who must be monitoring it, and it's not just providing a list to
the U.S. Trustee. In that order it was providing it to the creditors'
committee as well because the creditors' committee in the Murphy
Marine case kept on asking for the information as to what had been
paid, and the debtor refused to turn it over until an examiner was
appointed.
HON. FITZGERALD: I've been requiring it to the creditors' com-
mittee under a confidentiality agreement, but I'm a little leery about
doing that. I've only done it once on request because I think the cred-
itors' committee has a fiduciary obligation to all of the creditors in the
estate, and I'm really not sure of the interplay between the confidenti-
ality agreement where its professionals can't then share that informa-
tion with the committee and generally with the estate.
MR. CIERI: I asked Wei Lee for a couple extra minutes from the
next panel just because I think we are about to move into something
that's very important for people who practice law in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. But I just want to make two points from what Judy
Miller and Judge Fitzgerald said, which I think are really important.
The first is in the large Chapter 11 cases, the mega cases, the
KMarts and United Airlines of the world, it is very difficult for a
debtor to track specific categories of payments. And some day you're
going to have to show that you stayed within the payment guidelines.
Debtors have a lot of difficulty in tracking prepetition payments.
And then just following off of what Judge Fitzgerald said, she was
referring to the case with the lawyers getting the money back. Well,
it's one thing to get money back from lawyers. It's another thing to
get money back from vendors.
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And that leads us to the KMart case. And Judy talked about it, but
a decision came down yesterday in an appeal to the district court of
Capital Factors vs. KMart Corporation.
Capital Factors was a prepetition factor of KMart's accounts receiv-
able, owed about $20 million. On the first day of the bankruptcy case,
Capital Factors objected to a wide variety of first day relief sought by
KMart. First day relief to pay employees, first day relief to pay prepe-
tition vendors, first day relief to pay foreign vendors, and first day
relief to honor certain letters of credit relating to foreign vendors.
Typical kinds of relief, however, the size of the relief one could ar-
gue, is unprecedented. We're talking about critical vendor payments
being made on the first day of the case approaching $500 million. One
of these vendor payments was in excess of $70 million to Fleming.
Fleming you might recall was the grocery store distributor that I
referred to a little earlier that recently made a hard landing into Chap-
ter 11. Well, they actually got paid by KMart on day one. They got
paid on the basis that Fleming was so critical to KMart's existence that
if they didn't make this payment to Fleming, Fleming would eventu-
ally file for bankruptcy. You might note, by the way, that they did as
we talked about.
So in any event, this was an appeal that was taken by a prepetition
creditor of KMart of all of the first day or critical vendor payments.
Well, this appeal sort of meandered around for a while, and as many
of you might know from the newspapers, KMart is set to confirm its
plan of reorganization on April 14th and 15th of this coming week.
The plan of reorganization provides that any claims KMart might
have against people who received post-petition payments that were
not properly authorized were going to be waived.
Well, again, many of us involved in the case didn't pay much atten-
tion to this appeal. Most of us thought it had little chance of success
because ruling in favor of Capital Factors could be very disruptive to
the result of the KMart case. And, frankly, most of us bankruptcy
professionals and most of the judiciary have gotten used to this idea of
the Doctrine of Necessity. We haven't actually questioned its under-
pinnings. We may feel, as Judge Fitzgerald said and how I actually
strongly feel, that it may have gotten abused, but nobody actually
questioned whether or not it existed. It has been with us for a long
period of time.
Well, Judge Grady, a district court judge in Chicago, ruled yesterday
that there is no such thing as the Doctrine of Necessity on a per se
basis. He says that the bankruptcy court did not either have the statu-
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tory or equitable powers to authorize the payment of prepetition un-
secured claims outside of a plan of reorganization.
He says as a result of that, he doesn't even need to get to the issue
that Judy Miller and Judge Fitzgerald have discussed, which is whether
or not a payment is actually necessary to the preservation of the
debtor's estate. He would say there's no authority whatsoever to ever,
under any circumstances, pay prepetition claims.
Now, I open it up to the panelists and also to the future panelists as
to what they believe, but I'll just throw out that I think it's-and I
think Marc Kieselstein may have said this-no one will be filing a
large case in Chicago until this decision is dealt with.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, on the issue of assignments, the Third
Circuit has taken the matter on appeal en banc, so I think that's more
positive than Rick had indicated earlier. The solvency determination
issue listed by one district court judge in a mass tort case may or may
not be followed. It's not binding on anybody else. And the West Elec-
tronics intellectual property issue seems to be honored more in a
breach than not.
So, although I don't really want to be a rainmaker, maybe the Third
Circuit isn't such a bad place to file cases based on this.
MR. FISCHER: Well, but this is still the decision of only one district
judge.
MS. MILLER: That's right.
MR. FISCHER: I suspect that it won't be around long or the Seventh
Circuit will make it the law, one way or the other.
MR. CIERI: How are they going to deal with it quickly?
MR. FISCHER: I wouldn't be surprised if it so badly affects confir-
mation that it comes back up that way.
MR. CIERI: I'm looking for ideas.
MR. FISCHER: I'm wondering how the confirmation can go ahead.
Isn't this a lot of money?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Why is that a problem? It comes back.
HON. FITZGERALD: It appears to affect even the employee
claims. I mean, if that's going to be the ruling, every case is going to
have no employees. People will resign. They're not going to get paid
prepetition, let alone post.
MR. FISCHER: Well, that will wind up at least getting through the
exemption for the small amount, for the small employees that people
care about. Nobody cares about other employees.
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MS. MILLER: That presumes that is the limit to which they can pay
people.
HON. FITZGERALD: But this affects the letters of credit, and it
affects the foreign financing, so where are they going to get supplies?
MR. FISCHER: Well, the letters of credit, as I read it, is an invitation
to just prove the case, which I guess wasn't done.
HON. FITZGERALD: Maybe that's the issue. Maybe you need an
evidentiary hearing for every creditor-
MR. FISCHER: No, no, no.
MR. CIERI: No.
MR. FISCHER: He didn't say that on the critical vendors.
MS. MILLER: No. If anything, he's saying it doesn't matter what
you put forth-
HON. FITZGERALD: No, this opinion does.
MR. BAIRD: This opinion should not have come as a surprise to
people. There's Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Ma-
bey.8 There's a Ninth Circuit case that says the doctrine of necessity
just applies to railroads.
Critical vendor orders have been a dirty secret. It's hard to find
authority for them in the Bankruptcy Code.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, Professor, let's take Mabey. The Fourth
Circuit said that 10 percent of the claims he was paying were invalid
claims because there wasn't time to find out which women had genu-
ine claims and which not, and there's no authority to pay invalid
claims. So that does away with Mabey.
MS. MILLER: But the problem is when you don't have the justifiable
facts as set-as a bases under Coserv, it makes bad law because of bad
facts. And the question becomes, "what meaning does § 105(a) have,
and what do you do with the Supreme Court precedent that says the
policy of being able to maximize assets and reorganize"? Is it as an
important policy that underlies the entire Code if you can't pay some-
thing under the Necessity Doctrine?
MR. BAIRD: Mabey is a bad decision, but I'm not making the point
that Mabey is a great decision. I'm just saying Capital Factors
shouldn't have come as a surprise.
The Seventh Circuit has said over and over and over again, that you
do not ever just cite Section 105 and think you can get away with it.
8. 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987).
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HON. FITZGERALD: AlmoSt every circuit has that.
MR. BAIRD: Better arguments may exist. Some people are trying to
make Doctrine of Necessity arguments using § 363. All we're doing is
using the assets of the estate to enhance the value of the estate. Sec-
tion 363 authorizes that. Hence, there's authority via § 363 to have
critical vendor orders. But Capital Factors doesn't address them.
For some reason, maybe failure of advocacy, Capital Factors never
talked about § 363.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I would doubt, knowing who the debtor's coun-
sel is, that it was a failure of advocacy.
MR. BAIRD: So would I.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: In United, Judge Wedoff who was not a fan of
critical trade, thought that he might be the one getting the United case
before it was filed. So, he sat down and said, "okay, what's an intellec-
tually credible justification because I know I may have a big critical
trade motion coming my way." And he said, "don't talk to me about
§ 105. Talk to me about § 363. Tell me why what you're doing is go-
ing to create additional value for your stakeholders down the line."
That was an easy one to tell. We had a rigorous process. We had a
witness in court ready to talk about it at whatever length the court
wanted. And, in fact, when we came back for the final hearing, we
reported to the court that although we had gotten authority to pay
$40, $50 million in critical trade, we paid out $8,000 because some-
times your client, when they cross over to the dark side, they enjoy
themselves. They did not want to pay anything, and that was, I think,
an example of where it was done and done correctly, and the correct
intellectual underpinning was put in place for it.
MR. FISCHER: My guess is that there probably wasn't the underpin-
nings of the record for the bankruptcy court for the § 363 analysis you
just went through on the KMart first day order. That case has gone
through very quickly, and a lot of things just go through. And I think
Mr. Cieri was probably there on the first day.
MR. CIERI: No, I actually wasn't. Wei Lee has asked me to wrap up
the discussion. I think what you should take from this is, this is a very
significant decision. I think most of the panelists believe that it will
eventually be overturned because the Doctrine of Necessity is a very
critical doctrine.
MS. MILLER: We have one shaking head here.
MR. CIERI: Those academics, what are you going to do.
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MR. BAIRD: I'm not talking about what are the good, the true, and
the beautiful and about this being unexpected. I'm just making a pre-
diction about how the Seventh Circuit and how the Supreme Court
decides bankruptcy cases.
MS. MILLER: Plain language.
MR. BAIRD: If you go with a plain language approach what hap-
pens? If you make only a § 105 argument, the Seventh Circuit is not
going to say, "That's fine."
MR. BIENENSTOCK: As the professor just stated, and I agree, I just
wanted to raise one point not raised yet, Section 365 expressly pro-
vides for the payment of prepetition debt. All of these vendors have
contracts with the debtor and all of them are subject to adjustments
because so many widgets were defective, the wrong color, etc. So
there are always things left to do under these contracts to true up.
HON. FITZGERALD: But I insisted in the one case that I get some
§ 365 motions rather than § 363 for that very reason, and they didn't
want to do them because they don't want to assume all of the con-
tracts and-
MS. MILLER: And potentially they have the huge debt to assume as
part of the assumption process.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: My point is, there is express authority in the
Code to pay prepetition debt. It's wrong when this decision says there
isn't any-
HON. FITZGERALD: That's true.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: - because there's a lot, and there are other
sections as well. And I have to believe it was briefed, and if it wasn't,
it will be in the Seventh Circuit.
MR. CIERI: But I-and I'm not cutting the discussion off because I
actually have one more point to make because it's a point that Martin
made to me coming over here as we got lost trying to find the Law
School. And that is, well, what's the alternative for a debtor?
HON. FITZGERALD: Liquidation.
MR. CIERI: Well, Martin says, and I agree with this, you prepay it all
before you file.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: If you have the money.
MR. CIERI: If you have the money.
MS. MILLER: What about preferences?
HON. FITZGERALD: Yeah, then you've got all the preferences.
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MR. BIENENSTOCK: That's a different story. They may never get
prosecuted.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, they-yeah, they wouldn't-I would
agree with that if most cases actually reorganized, but most cases
don't actually reorganize. And then what you get is a Chapter 7 trus-
tee who files preferences by the thousands.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: But those statistics mix in the single asset real
estate with the United Airlines and KMart, and it's not fair.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: You also may need your interim DIP order in
place before you got the cash to make the request.
HON. FITZGERALD: That's true, too.
MR. FISCHER: But I think that the problem in this case might be
the bankruptcy court record.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Don't rest on your offer of proof.
MR. FISCHER: Marc and I were just saying, as attractive as it is
when you think the judge is just going to sign the order, create the
record.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Absolutely.
HON. FITZGERALD: What happens if all the vendors demand
some advance deposit?
MR. FISCHER: Who's the judge?
MR. BAIRD: This is worse than that. There are a lot of prepetition
people who are technically prepetition creditors who can never do
deals.
In the Marvel Comics case, you had all these 12 and 13-year-olds
prepaid for subscriptions. Are you going to cut them all off?
MR. CIERI: Well, there was no shortness of discussion.
WEI LEE: Thank you. Obviously a lot of great ideas, great points of
view from different perspectives by our other panelists.
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